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Abstract 
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published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
 
This paper considers the extent of retail banking integration in the Communauté Economique et 
Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) and the level of bank competition at the regional level. 
Using a mix of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the paper finds some evidence of price 
convergence in average interest rate spreads. However, this observed fact is not supported by an 
increase in cross-border flows in retail loans and deposits, and price convergence may merely 
reflect excess liquidity in the region. Other data also indicate that bank competition within the 
CEMAC as a region is limited, complementing the findings on integration. Addressing shortfalls 
in legal and regulatory frameworks, infrastructure, and markets would facilitate integration. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
This paper2 examines the issue of banking sector integration and competition in the 
Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), with a focus on the 
integration of products and services in retail banking, as financial markets are limited in size 
(Box 1). A common currency and monetary policy and the adoption of a common set of 
convergence criteria for the monetary union, may be expected to lead to a process of 
financial integration. Banking sector integration can be viewed as a process of convergence 
into a single market for banking products and services, where all buyers and sellers within 
CEMAC have opportunities to transact on the most favorable terms. However, integration 
may not materialize for a number of reasons: (i) incentives of the economic agents to operate 
in other countries within the union (home bias); (ii) institutional conditions of the countries 
of origin and reception (for instance in terms of property rights protection); and (iii) impact 
of regulation. This paper assesses the degree of integration achieved by the banking systems 
in CEMAC, explores the major obstacles to further integration, and seeks to quantify the 
effects of integration on the efficiency and profitability of banks.  
While no quantitative study has so far examined banking sector integration and competition 
in the CEMAC zone, several key indicators can be used to gauge the degree of financial 
integration. An extensive literature on the subject exists for European Union (EU) countries, 
with several papers analyzing the extent to which the “single market” has led to more 
integrated banking markets, and offering insights on the mechanisms at play.3 Various 
methods allow a quantitative assessment of the degree of financial integration and are based 
on: (i) interest rate data; (ii) bank structure data (branches versus subsidiaries); (iii) mergers 
and acquisitions data; and (iv) bank concentration data. For instance, comparable interest rate 
data across the EU fail to show a significant reduction in spread differentials. This would be 
consistent with the relatively limited increase in the presence of foreign credit institutions in 
individual EU retail banking markets. A clear trend towards dominance of branches over 
subsidiaries also emerges from EU data (Adams et al., 2002), although, as pointed out by 
Dermine (2002) and Rosengreen (2002), domestic subsidiaries remain important, potentially 
indicating insufficient integration. A geographical breakdown of mergers and acquisitions 
shows very clearly that the consolidation that took place during the second half of the 1990s 
took place within nations much more than across nations (as in earlier periods—see Gual 
(1993). Finally, a comparison of the evolution of concentration figures at the national level, 
the EU level, and in the United States was conducted by DeYoung (1999). If mergers are 
                                                 
2 This working paper draws on research conducted within MCM on banking integration in 
the CFA Franc Zone, and benefited from discussions with the authorities in the context of the 
2006 joint IMF/WB regional FSAP missions to CEMAC. Data used is available from public 
or commercial sources. 
3 Adam et al. (2002), Dermine (2003a), Manna (2004), Gual (2004), European Commission 
(2005), to name a few. 
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primarily taking place within national borders, concentration at the country level increases, 
while EU-wide concentration need not increase. 
 
 Box 1. CEMAC Institutional and Economic Background 
Previously known as the Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), the 
Communauté Economique et Monétaire d’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) was created in March 1994 as a 
customs and monetary union among six former French Central African countries. CEMAC includes: 
Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo ( Brazzaville), Equatorial Guinea, and 
Gabon. Along with WAEMU, it is one of the most important and structured regional groupings in 
Africa. 
 
The Conference of the Heads of State meets at least once a year to define overall guidelines for the 
grouping’s policies. CEMAC’s Executive Secretariat is in charge of monitoring the implementation of 
agreed measures. The main policy objectives consist in creating a fully functional and effective customs 
union, ensuring a system of macroeconomic surveillance and promoting sectoral policies that help create 
a common market for goods, capital, and services. 
 
The regional banking supervision commission the Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale 
(COBAC) was established on October 16, 1990. On January 17, 1992, a convention was signed, 
establishing the harmonization of banking regulations across CEMAC. Although legally independent, 
COBAC is closely related to the Banque des Etats d’Afrique Centrale (BEAC), whose governor is also 
the chair of COBAC, and depends on BEAC for its financial and human resources. COBAC’s main role 
is ensuring banks’ compliance with prudential norms, as well as issuing and withdrawing (in 
coordination with the country’s MOF) banking licenses. 
 
The recent policy environment for the CEMAC (see 2006 IMF Article IV Staff Report for CEMAC) has 
been shaped by increasing oil prices, higher oil output and revenues, and the sharp appreciation of the 
franc (along with the euro) against the U.S. dollar. The zone as a whole has benefited from a substantial 
increase in growth (reaching nearly 7 percent in 2004 and 4 percent in 2005), inflation below euro area 
levels, and substantial increases in foreign exchange reserves. These overall positive economic 
developments, however, also pose challenges to the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies. Main policy 
challenges relate to the use of oil-related inflows and to setting common policies in the context of 
significant cross-country differences in economic performance.  
 
Since the ratification of the CEMAC treaty in 1999, the region has been moving, albeit slowly, towards 
fuller economic and monetary integration. Macroeconomic convergence has improved with greater 
country adherence to both fiscal and nonfiscal criteria of convergence modeled on the EU experience. 
However, limited progress has been achieved in enhancing the functioning of the customs union. 
Administrative hurdles and an absence of economic complementarities continue to hinder the flow of 
goods, services, and people in the subregion. Intraregional trade still remains low—even in comparison 
to its West African counterpart.  
 
 
The paper considers first the extent to which financial sector integration has developed 
in CEMAC, before carrying out an assessment of impediments to greater financial 
integration and of the degree of competition. An overview of the CEMAC’s banking 
sectors shows the very limited degree of financial intermediation reached so far in CEMAC 
(Section II). Although important progress has been made to regulate the financial sector at 
the regional level, little has been achieved in facilitating integration of banking markets, as 
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regional infrastructure and markets are not sufficiently well developed (Section III). 
Moreover, within CEMAC and beyond the national boundaries of the six countries, bank 
competition seems to stay at a relatively low level. To assess the degree of bank competition 
at the regional level, we used an estimated H statistic (using a standard Panzar Rosse model 
to assess bank competition) that places CEMAC—as a region—among the least competitive 
environments (Section IV). Finally, we identify a number of policies that could be 
implemented to facilitate regional integration. Policy recommendations include, on the legal 
and regulatory framework side, lifting obstacles to the implementation of the agrément 
unique, and, on the infrastructure side, developing a coherent strategy to develop regional 
interbank and debt markets consistent with efforts aimed at improving the framework for 
systemic liquidity at the regional level. 
II.   OVERVIEW OF CEMAC’S BANKING SECTORS 
The financial system in CEMAC is bank-dominated and mostly foreign-owned (Table 1). 
Cameroon and Gabon, the two largest economic powers in the subregion, account for about 
three-fourths of total assets and loans. There are 33 deposit-taking banks in operation in 
CEMAC as of end-2005, 31 of which are privately owned, and 23 of which are foreign-
owned by entities outside CEMAC. Eight banks do not comply with the minimum capital 
adequacy ratio (8 percent), including five with negative equity. 
Government ownership of banks in CEMAC is limited and has been declining since the 
restructuring of the sector in the mid-1990s. At the regional level, as of end-2005, the 
average government share of bank capital is about 20 percent, while central government 
share of deposits is around 9 percent. In contrast to the situation prevailing in other countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), banks have considerably limited their direct lending to 
governments.  
Financial depth in CEMAC is low (Table 2). The ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP 
(around 7 percent), and the ratio of bank deposits to GDP (around 17 percent) are much 
lower than in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), but comparable 
to the median deposits to GDP ratio for SSA. As of end-2004 (Table 3), commercial banks 
employed relatively few employees (5,700), in a limited number of branches (190, against 
120 in 2000). Branch density is limited—just reaching the density of Ghana or Nigeria would 
require a tripling of the number of branches (Figure 1).4 There is significant scope for further 
intermediation in several countries, while other countries seem over-extended: Chad and the 
Central African Republic have loan-to-deposit ratios above 100 percent, reflecting a narrower 
deposit base and a tighter liquidity situation relative to Cameroon and the Congo, for 
example. In Cameroon, as a result of past bank restructuring episodes, banks hold a large 
share of government securities, which tends to limit their capacity and willingness to extend 
loans. 
                                                 
4 Branch density in the CEMAC is about one hundred times lower than in a number of 
densely banked countries, for example Germany, France, Austria, Belgium, or Canada.  
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Table 1. CEMAC: Major Banking Groups, December 2004 
Country
Assets 
(mil CFA)
Capital 
(mil CFA)
State Foreign Local Ult. Owner 1/ Name (Country) Ult. Owner 1/Share 2/
Cameroon BICEC 333,994 25,367 52.5 47.5 0 Natexis/BP ... ... ...
(10 Banks) Crédit Lyonnais Cameroun S. A. 258,315 14,439 35 65 0 CALYON UGB (Gabon) CALYON 56.25
CL (Congo) CALYON 80.99
Société Générale de Banques au Cameroun 314,302 34,049 25.6 58.08 16.32 SG SGBT (Tchad) SG France 30
SGBGE (GE) SG France 57.24
Standard Chartered  Bank Cameroon 144,260 20,678 0 100 0 SC ... ... ...
AFRILAND FIRST  BANK 181,028 6,680 0 0 100 CCEI (GE) Afriland 51
AMITY BANK Cameroon 36,838 6,026 0 ? ? ... ... ...
CITIBANK N. A. Cameroon 55,682 6,369 0 100 0 CitiCorp Citibank (Gabon) CitiCorp 100
Commercial Bank of Cameroon 153,263 13,059 0 15 85 DEG CBCA (RCA) FOTSO 59.5
CBT (Tchad) FOTSO 50.68
Union Bank of Cameroon PLC 28,118 5,405 92.87 7.13 0 Cr. Unions ... ... ...
Ecobank Cameroun S. A 59,670 3,325 0 97 3 Ecobank ... ... ...
C.A.R. Banque Populaire Maroco-Centrafricaine 17417 6024 37.5 62.5 0 Morocco ... ... ...
(3 Banks) Banque Internationale pour le Centrafrique 20,877 1,928 11.7 50 38.3 Belg.-COFIPABIAT (Tchad) COFIPA 80.6
COFIPA (Congo) COFIPA 69.43
Commercial Bank Centrafrique 23,563 3,423 10 59.5 30.5 FOTSO CBC (Cameroon) DEG 15
CBT (Tchad) FOTSO 50.68
Congo Cofipa Investment Bank Congo 50,699 3,000 10 77.43 12.57 COFIPA ... ... ...
(4 Banks) Crédit Lyonnais Congo S.A. 72,476 4,211 9 81 10 CALYON CL (Cameroon) CALYON 65
UGB (Gabon) CALYON 56.25
BGFIBANK CONGO 72,421 7,504 0 85 15 BGFI Gabon BGFI (GABON) private inv. 29.81
BGFI (GE) BGFI Gabon 55
La Congolaise de Banque 50,177 4,457 10 25 65 ? ... ... ...
Gabon BICIG 271,844 33,799 26.3 46.67 27.03 BNP ... ... ...
(6 Banks) Banque Gabonaise de Développement 52,613 33,212 69.01 30.99 0 State ... ... ...
BGFIBANK GABON 281,217 56,997 23 14 63 BGFI (Congo) BGFI Gabon 60
BGFI (GE) BGFI Gabon 55
CITIBANK N. A. GABON 72,368 14,371 0 100 0 CitiCorp CitiBank (CamerooCitiCorp 100
Union Gabonaise de Banque 170,778 14,021 25 74.2 0.8 CALYON CL (Cameroon) CALYON 65
CL (Congo) CALYON 80.99
Financial Bank Gabon 7,758 2,019 1.58 70 28.42 FB Togo FB (Tchad) FB Togo 67.83
Equatorial BGFIBANK-GUINEE EQUATORIALE 25,914 1,559 15 55 30 BGFI Gabon BGFI (Gabon) private inv. 29.81
Guinea BGFI (Congo) BGFI Gabon 60
(3 Banks) SGBGE 111,474 6,619 31.8 57.25 10.95 SG SGBC (Cameroon)SG France 58.08
SGBT (Tchad) SG France 30
CCEI BANK GUINEE-EQUATORIALE 91,306 7,085 10 77 13 Afriland Afriland (Cam.) Cam.private 100
Chad Banque Agricole du Soudan au Tchad 3,165 968 0 100 0 Sudan ... ... ...
(7 Banks) Banque Commerciale du Chari 29,027 4,099 50 50 0 Libya ... ... ...
Commercial Bank Tchad 40,037 6,999 17.48 82.52 0 FOTSO ... ... ...
Banque Internationale pour l’Afrique au Tchad 29,911 3,014 0 80.6 19.4 COFIPA COFIPA (Congo) COFIPA 69.43
Société Générale Tchadienne de Banque 43,840 4,524 20 76 4 SG SGBC (Cameroon)SG France 58.08
SGBGE (GE) SG France 57.24
Financial Bank Tchad 22,658 1,879 0 100 0 FB Togo FB (Gabon) FB Togo 70
BSIC 5,280 2,000 0 100 0 Libya ... ... ...
Sources: COBAC.
NoteL C.A.R.= Central African Republic.
1/ Ultimate Owner is owner of biggest share of total capital.
2/ Represents percentage share of capital owned by ultimate owner out of total capital of associated bank.
Bank Name Ownership (% of Capital) Associated Banks in CEMAC
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Table 2. CEMAC: Financial Intermediation, December 2005 
(In percent) 
  
Private 
Credit/GDP 
Bank 
Deposits/GDP 
Loan-Deposit 
Ratio 
Overhead 
Costs 1/ 
Cameroon 9.4 25.2 40.9 2.89 
CAR 6.6 5.3 152.0 3.13 
Congo 2.5 10.5 25.9 3.32 
Gabon 8.1 15.0 68.2 2.58 
Eq. Guinea 2.5 10.5 40.7 4.57 
Chad 5.2 6.2 111.2 5.15 
CEMAC 6.8 16.8 48.0 3.03 
WAEMU 15.4 22.5 79.4 … 
SSA … 13.4 … … 
 
   Sources: COBAC, IFS, and IMF staff calculations.  
 
   1/ in percent of total earning assets (TEA). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Bank Branch Density in CEMAC and Selected African Countries 
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   Sources: Beck et al. (2005), and IMF staff calculations. 
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Table 3. Commercial Bank Branches and Employees in CEMAC, December 2004 
 
Banks Employees Branches 
Afriland First Bank Cameroun 311 12 
Amity Bank Cameroon PLC. 168   9 
Banque Agricole du Soudan au Tchad   22   1 
Banque Commerciale du Chari 105   3 
Banque Gabonaise de Développement 214   7 
Banque Internationale du Cameroun pour l'Épargne et le Crédit 548 27 
Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique au Tchad 113   4 
Banque Internationale pour le Centrafrique   91   3 
Banque Internationale pour Commerce et Industrie du Gabon 473 15 
Banque Populaire Maroco-Centrafricaine   54   1 
Banque Sahélo-saharienne pour Investissement et Commerce Tchad   45   1 
BGFIBANK 380   4 
BGFIBANK Congo   89   3 
BGFIBANK Guinée Equatoriale   22   1 
CCEI Bank Guinée Équatoriale   86   4 
Citibank N,A Cameroon   51   2 
Citibank N.A Gabon   42   2 
Commercial Bank Centrafrique   84   2 
Commercial Bank of Cameroon 292   6 
Commercial Bank Tchad   80   2 
Cofipa Investment Bank 147 13 
Crédit Lyonnais Cameroun S.A 506 13 
Crédit Lyonnais Congo 108   5 
EcoBank Cameroun   72   2 
Financial Bank Gabon   18   1 
Financial Bank Tchad   40   1 
La Congolaise de Banque 183   7 
Société Générale de Banque au Cameroun 563 18 
Société Générale de Banques en Guinée Équatoriale 176   5 
Société Générale Tchadienne de Banque 160   5 
Standard Chartered Bank Cameroon S.A 130   2 
Union Bank of Cameroon PLC.   93   6 
Union Gabonaise de Banque 241   4 
 
   Source: COBAC. 
 
 
Banking sectors are highly concentrated in four out of six CEMAC countries (Table 4). 
However, concentration levels have somewhat decreased since 2002 and are considered 
moderate for Cameroon and Chad, both with Herfindahl-Hirchman Index (HHI) values 
9 
below 2,000.5 The number of banks increased from 29 in 2002 to 33 in 2005, and no major 
consolidation occurred during that period. 
 
Table 4. CEMAC: Banking Concentration, 2002–05 
 
 HH Index 2002 HH Index 2005 
Cameroon 
1,621 1,416 
Central African Republic 3,673 3,421 
Congo 3,098 2,689 
Gabon 2,716 2,734 
Equatorial Guinea 4,346 3,832 
Chad 
 
2,154 1,933 
 
   Source: IMF staff calculations.  
 
Foreign banks dominate the banking sector (Table 1). With foreign banks controlling 
63 percent of total assets in the banking system or 10.9 percent of GDP, several large foreign 
banking groups are particularly dominant. Two French groups each operate in three out of 
the six CEMAC countries, while other foreign groups include COFIPA, Financial Bank, and 
Citibank. On the other hand, local groups, in particular Afriland and BGFIBANK, have 
commanding market shares (both in assets and in capital) in the Congo, Gabon, and 
Equatorial Guinea. In Chad, the only country with no local privately-owned banks, two banks 
are majority owned by the Libyan government, and one by the Sudanese government. 
The soundness of banks in CEMAC differs greatly across countries or groups of banks 
(Table 5). We have grouped the banks into four categories: Group I: foreign-owned banking 
groups (outside CEMAC); Group II: locally-owned banks or groups (inside CEMAC);6 
Group III: local groups; and Group IV: state-owned banks, including banks owned by foreign 
states. 
 
                                                 
5 HHI values between 1,000 and 2,000 indicate a moderate level of concentration; values 
above 2,000 indicate high levels of concentration. The index is calculated by summing up the 
squared relative market shares (in percentage points) of all the banks: ∑= 1 2
n
nXINDEX , where 
X is the market share in percentage points. 
6 Group II includes banks in Group III. 
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Table 5. CEMAC: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators by Bank Groups 
(In percent, unless otherwise noted) 
 
(December 2005) Group I Group II Group III Group IV CEMAC 
 
Percentage of total banking assets 
 
55.3 
 
43.2 
 
26.3 
 
4.4 
 
129.3 
 
Capital adequacy      
Regulatory capital/risk-weighted assets 11.0 6.9 8.3 … 10.8 
Equity over total assets 
 
9.4 11.0 12.1 … 10.8 
Asset quality      
    NPLs net of provisions/gross loans 2.0 3.4 2.2 5.6 2.9 
    Provisions over NPLs 
 
84.4 73.0 78.6 78.7 79.1 
Profitability      
Average return on assets (ROA) 1.8 2.2 2.3 -0.2 1.8 
Average return on equity (ROE) 19.4 19.8 19.0 -0.6 16.9 
 
   Sources: COBAC, and IMF staff calculations.  
 
   1/ Total percentages do not add up to 100 (see footnote 5). 
 
 
We observed the following regarding banking soundness: 
• Group I banks appear at end-2005 to be better capitalized than the regional average 
(owing to financial connections to parent companies). They have a lower level of 
nonperforming loans (NPLs), and a better-than-average rate of NPL provisioning.  
• Higher provisioning has, among other factors, reduced the profitability for banks in 
Group I relative to other banks.  
• Group IV banks operate for the most part at a loss and have high levels of NPLs, 
consistent with the performance of most state-owned banks in SSA. 
Excess liquidity in the banking system, due to a large extent to growing oil-related 
surpluses has been growing significantly since 2001 and has now reached high levels. 
Banks tend to hold reserves in excess of those mandated by BEAC and have increased 
susbtantially their liquidity ratios (Figure 2). This phenomenon is further exacerbated by the 
lack of well functioning money, interbank, and capital markets, and substantial lags in 
monetary policy to address this situation (IMF 2006). Excess liquidity is unequally 
distributed among countries, with most countries showing excess liquidity and two countries 
experiencing a tighter liquidity situation (Central African Republic and Chad).
11 
 
 
Figure 2. CEMAC: Liquid Assets Over Short-Term Liabilities, 2001–04 1/ 
(In percent) 
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1/ Maturities of one month or less. 
 
 
III.   THE STATE OF CEMAC’S BANKING INTEGRATION 
The ultimate goal of CEMAC’s banking integration policies is to create a more efficient 
market for financial services, which ultimately will contribute to higher growth. A larger 
market should, in theory, lead to a more competitive environment, with the development of 
stronger credit institutions, able to offer a wider and more complex array of financial 
products and services. Several reports (commissioned by the EU, for example) have stressed 
the relationship between market size and efficiency and have attempted to estimate the 
magnitude of these effects. It is therefore necessary to assess first the degree of integration of 
CEMAC markets and then the extent to which such integration is having its expected positive 
effects on the structure and performance of CEMAC banking. Later in Section IV, we 
examine the degree of efficiency and competition. 
A.   Degree of Integration 
Banking integration can be viewed as a process of convergence into a single market for 
banking products and services, where all buyers and sellers within the union have 
opportunities to transact on the most favorable terms. The law of one price remains the 
benchmark for studies on banking integration, focusing on interest rate convergence: a single 
market must be characterized by only one price for the product that defines the market. 
Another strand of the literature on banking integration focuses on quantities. When the 
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enlargement of a market coincides with a change in the competitive advantages of the firms 
in initial markets, changes in equilibrium market shares are expected and more efficient 
banks will ultimately gain a larger equilibrium market share (Manna 2004). In effect, if 
initially segregated national banking markets evolve into a single market, domestic banks 
will start to compete and those that are more efficient will gain market share at the expense 
of the less efficient ones. Cross-border flows of deposits may be observed in response to the 
new competitive conditions, which reflect the transition from the old to the new equilibrium. 
Such a process will eventually lead to greater efficiency of the banking markets. 
Differing levels of competition among market segments and of market integration are to be 
expected. For each market segment (households, SMEs, large corporates), the extent of 
integration can be assessed as is usually done in trade economics, by focusing on the 
evolution of price convergence, or through a quantity indicator, such as cross-border flows or 
the market share of foreign entities. 
• Price convergence implies that price differentials for the same financial service 
should be reduced, down to a level explained mostly by the existence of arbitrage or 
transportation costs. 
• Integration measured by quantities usually comes as a complement. The absence of 
cross-border flows (or the small market share of foreign competitors) need not be 
incompatible with a substantial degree of integration, provided that the threat of 
foreign entry/competition keeps the markets integrated—notably with price 
differences not exceeding the costs of arbitrage (Gual 2004). 
Price-based indicators 
 
Given data limitations, we only look at CEMAC’s retail bank credit markets between 1999 
and 2004. The interbank money market is shallow and the capital market is not yet 
operational. Furthermore, wholesale banking (or banking services between merchant or 
investment banks and other financial institutions) is virtually nonexistent in CEMAC. 
Bank profitability is relatively high and reflects large differences in operating environments. 
In 2005, the average return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) were 2 percent 
and 18 percent, respectively, with significant differences between countries. The share of fee 
income is significantly higher than the gross margin on loans for all countries except the 
Congo reflecting reliance on fee income to compensate for the low level of income derived 
from lending activities and for the effects of interest rate regulations (Table 6). Margins in 
CEMAC can appear substantial, but they also reflect the risks associated with banking 
activity in the region, and notably a high degree of credit and operational risk. Foreign banks, 
which tend to be better capitalized, also show a slightly smaller ROE than that for local 
banks, notably due to a higher provisioning rate (about 84 percent of NPLs). Three factors 
explain country differences in profitability (Table 6): (i) the weight of NPLs and provisions; 
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(ii) differences in operational efficiency; and (iii) the different weights of taxation on profits7. 
The latter is a distortion to competition within the CEMAC region given the wide differences 
in taxation regimes for banks (in Gabon, the absence of tax deductibility of provisions has 
been a long-standing issue). 
 
 
Table 6. Intermediation Margins, December 2004 
(In percent of total earning assets TEA, unless otherwise noted) 
  Cameroon CAR Congo Gabon 
Eq. 
Guinea Chad CEMAC 
Earning assets (TEA) 1/ 1,201 65 153 743 118 132 2,411 
Gross margin on TEA 2/ 8.0 8.3 9.3 8.6 10.0 9.6 8.5 
NPLs provisioning 0.8 2.4 0.1 0.8 0.8 1.1 0.8 
Net margin on TEA 7.1 5.9 9.2 7.8 9.2 8.5 7.7 
Other income net 3/ 9.5 9.2 9.1 9.3 14.6 13.0 9.9 
Total margin on TEA 16.7 15.1 18.3 17.2 23.8 21.5 17.6 
Overhead expenses 2.9 3.1 3.3 2.6 4.6 5.1 3.0 
Personnel expenses 2.3 2.0 2.7 3.2 2.0 3.5 2.6 
Margin before taxes 11.5 9.9 12.2 11.4 17.2 12.8 11.9 
Taxes 1.2 0.4 0.7 1.5 0.7 1.1 1.2 
Margin after taxes 10.3 9.5 11.6 9.9 16.5 11.7 10.7 
 
   Sources: COBAC, and IMF staff estimates.  
 
   1/ Total earning assets (in CFAF billions) include BEAC and national bills and bonds, net interbank 
loans, and gross loans.  
   2/ Gross margin on assets is difference between average return on loans and average cost of funding as 
calculated by COBAC. 
   3/ Includes net income on operations de tresorerie, operations divers, and operations sur credit-bail. 
 
 
However, notwithstanding these factors affecting profitability, interest rate margins have 
converged across countries. The average ROA and ROE are on the decline, as are 
intermediation margins, which declined by two percentage points to 8.5 percent from 2000 
to 2004 (Figure 3). This decline, most notable in the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and the 
Central African Republic, reflects primarily lower returns on loans (11 percent as of 
                                                 
7 The cost of intermediation may also be affected by differences in reserve requirements. 
Although differences in reserve requirements are motivated by the dispersion of liquidity 
situations within the region, they also create possibilities for regulatory arbitrage and 
distortions to competition at the regional level. 
14 
end 2004), whereas the average cost of funds (at 2.5 percent) has been stable, but with 
differences between countries.8  
Figure 3. CEMAC: Evolution of Average Interest Rate Spreads, 2000–04 
(In percent) 
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   Source: COBAC. 
 
 
The evolution of average interest rate spreads in the CEMAC between 2000 and 2004 points 
to a significant price convergence.9 Borrowing from a methodology used by Adam et al. 
(2002) and Sy (2006), we estimate one measure of financial integration: sigma-convergence 
(Figure 4).10 The large decrease of sigma-convergence from 1999 to 2004 in CEMAC points 
toward a significant degree of price convergence in retail banking interest rates during that 
period. We also note a significant decrease in the volatility of spreads, recorded at end-2004 
as being 0.8 standard deviation units, down from almost 4 standard deviation units in 1999. 
In other words, average bank spreads in CEMAC have now converged toward a common 
level (currently around 8.5 percent), with increasingly diminishing variations between 
countries since 1999
                                                 
8 The decrease in margins could act as an incentive for banks to broaden their clientele. However, this would 
require that efforts be made to improve the operating environment of banks and debt recovery in the region. 
9 Average spread is calculated ex-post as average return on credit minus average cost of 
credit. 
10 Sigma-convergence captures the standard deviation of interest rates across countries at 
each point in time. This measure is often used to assess the degree of integration in monetary 
unions. Using COBAC’s cross-sectional time-series of average interest rate spreads, we 
estimate and plot the evolution of sigma-convergence over time. 
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Figure 4. CEMAC: Sigma-Convergence of Spreads, 1999–2004 
 
   Sources: COBAC and IMF staff calculations. 
 
 
The convergence in spreads could be due to a number of factors. Notably, the current 
situation of excess liquidity in the region (Figure 5) is likely to contribute to a decrease in 
margins, and more importantly to a decrease in lending rates, especially in regard to the best 
corporate risks. Government deposits in banks and the settlement of government arrears have 
produced a strong increase in bank deposits (up nearly 25 percent in 2005). The accelerated 
growth in bank deposits, combined with a scarcity of investment opportunities, has led to an 
escalation of surplus bank liquidity.11 In times of high liquidity and limited lending 
opportunities, the dispersion of spreads is likely to decline. This evolution can not be 
explained by cross-border flows of liquidity but by the mere fact that a situation of excess 
liquidity has occurred simultaneously in several countries of the region. In essence, although 
spread convergence is often regarded as real evidence of financial integration, we find that, 
for CEMAC, this interpretation is not corroborated by further evidence (see below) and is the 
likely manifestation of masking factors, such as excess liquidity and limited lending 
opportunities. 
                                                 
11 Limited investment opportunities in the CEMAC can be linked to a number of factors: (i)a 
restricted economic diversification with a few high profile customers, with risk concentration 
rules rapidly binding in this context; (ii) interest rate regulations (notably a ceiling on bank 
lending rates currently set at 15 percent), which are likely to limit the feasibility of bank 
lending to credit constrained SMEs and households; and (iii) the absence of a modern 
financial market where banks can diversify their assets. The lack of opportunities to shape an 
adequate risk/return profile also means that banks have to increase the return on their 
operations, either through interest or fees, with customers who actually present a tolerable 
level of risk. 
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Figure 5. CEMAC: Evolution of deposits, credit, and interest rates (2000-05) 
(In billions CFAF and percentage, unless otherwise noted) 
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   Source: IFS. 
 
Quantity-based indicators 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that cross-border flows are still negligible in retail loans and 
deposits, suggesting that integration is not taking place. Based on data collected from 
COBAC, banks in the CEMAC still work primarily with their domestic customers, which 
explains the lack of cross-border flows.12 
Using a different quantitative indicator (cross-border entry and ownership), we show well-
established links between foreign and CEMAC retail markets. Foreign bank branches often 
concentrate on corporate finance services, trading activities, and private banking, rather than 
retail activities. Retail businesses are more difficult to enter as domestic banks usually enjoy 
substantial competitive advantages. Thus, the most effective way of gaining entry to the 
CEMAC retail sector has been to merge with or acquire an existing local bank. A number of 
such operations have indeed taken place over the past ten years or so, mostly by French 
banking groups as the current market structure in CEMAC shows (Table 3). After a series of 
bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s, several banks were restructured and 
government ownership was reduced, while foreign ownership increased. Although this might 
indicate that integration is present and progressing, a mere change in the ownership structure 
                                                 
12 Even in the euro area, banks still work exclusively with their national customers on 
average in the case of 89 percent of their loans and 84 percent of their deposit base (Cabral et 
al. 2002). 
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may not necessarily affect the pricing behavior of financial institutions. The significant 
amount of foreign ownership reflects, at least, tangible links between local banking and 
global groups. 
B.   Obstacles to Integration 
So far, the common currency and a comprehensive regional institutional setup have not led to 
financial integration in the region. The regional institutional setup notably includes a 
common central bank and bank supervisor, a common legal framework and regional 
decision-making bodies at the political level. Some important progress has been made to 
regulate the financial sector at the regional level, but limited progress has been made in 
facilitating integration of banking markets. Obstacles include: (i) limited effectiveness of the 
instruments that have been set up (notably agrément unique); (ii) lags in infrastructure and 
markets; and (iii) reputation effects and consumer preferences.  
The agrément unique or single banking license procedure—a major step for integration—is 
not functioning as expected. In 2001, following the example of the EU and the WAEMU, an 
agrément unique procedure was approved in CEMAC (Box 2). In practice, no application for 
a single banking license has been submitted to COBAC for a number of potential reasons, 
including the fact that banks interested in the procedure are already present in several 
countries. The chosen method for developing bank networks in CEMAC has been so far the 
purchase of existing institutions, often during restructuring episodes. In slight contrast with 
the situation prevailing in the EU, the issue of different national supervisors and supervisory 
practices does not pose a problem in CEMAC given the existence of the COBAC, but 
barriers of a rather political and administrative nature (e.g., the role of the ministries of 
finance of CEMAC countries in pre-approving licensing applications) do contribute to the 
inefficient functioning of the agrément unique.  
Even with the eventual lifting of regulatory restrictions and barriers of a political nature, 
market forces may not be effective in pushing banks to develop their networks in the region. 
Banks may be enticed to develop their networks if there is evidence of overbanking at the 
country level (with inefficiently overlapping branch networks, which does not appear to be 
the case in the region), and/or if banks are failing to operate at an appropriate level of 
efficiency for other reasons. Financial depth is very low in the case of CEMAC and thus 
points towards significant potential growth of the banking sector through monetization, but 
probably only to the extent that member countries manage to achieve a greater diversification 
of their economies and a more conducive business environment. 
Regional infrastructure and markets are not sufficiently developed to facilitate banking 
integration (Box 3). There is virtually no regional interbank market (total interbank market 
volume for the whole CEMAC was a mere 110 CFA billions in 2003 and 90 CFA billions in 
2004) and debt market. To the extent that interbank flows have not developed, the apparent 
progress in integration that could be inferred from the narrowing of retail spreads could be 
further questioned. In particular, there is a limited flow of liquidity between countries with 
excess liquidity and those (like the Central African Republic and Chad) with a tighter 
liquidity situation. Efforts to mobilize various sources of funding are constrained by the 
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overall situation of excess liquidity or limited to banks within the same group. The fact that 
foreign banks may have available financing and undertake liquidity management through 
their parent companies may partly explain the absence of an active interbank market, at least 
in foreign currency, and the lack of cross-border transactions. Moreover, the shortcomings in 
transparency and disclosure make it difficult for banks in one country to assess the 
creditworthiness of banks in neighboring countries, and the absence of a reliable payment 
system or government securities market renders collateralized lending difficult. In addition, 
excess liquidity and regulation of interest rates (Figure 5) limit bank competition to mobilize 
savings: banks have no incentive to increase the number of depositors when their 
remunerated resources are costly in the context of regulated interest rates, and when liquidity 
is high in the economy. Hence, at best, banks guide depositors toward sight deposits which 
are more volatile. Furthermore, while the BEAC has designed a framework for government 
securities issuance at the regional level, no country has yet made use of the framework.  
 
Box 2. Agrément Unique in the European Union, WAEMU, and CEMAC 
European Union 
In 1989, the “Second Banking Directive” instituted the Agrément Unique, as a means to achieve the 
objectives of the Single Market. The Agrément Unique was broadened in 1993 to cover investment services 
and came into force the same year. It now covers 25 states, plus Iceland and Norway and all the related texts 
were consolidated in 2000 into Directive 2000/12/EC. A credit institution is allowed to open branches in 
other EU member states, so long as it is authorized to do so by its home country supervisor. The home 
country supervisor has the power to scrutinize the adequacy of the institution’s administrative structure and 
financial situation and, if appropriate, to prohibit the bank from opening a branch in another member state. 
However, the justification for any negative decision must be disclosed, allowing the bank to contest the 
supervisor’s decision in court. In the EU, the expansion of cross-border banking services has occurred 
equally through branches and subsidiaries (Walkner and Raes, 2005). Despite a lower initial cost in terms of 
capital of establishing branches, banks seem to hesitate to enter other European markets through greenfield 
operations and as a result seem to opt for mergers and acquisitions as a preferred expansion strategy.  
WAEMU 
The Council of Ministers opted for an Agrément Unique procedure in 1998 which took effect on 
January 1, 1999. For an already established bank, the application for agrément unique is presented at the 
BCEAO national office and a decision is taken within three months by the Regional Banking Commission, 
after consultation with the ministry of finance of the country of origin and of the country of destination. In 
December 2004 (Avis 01/RB/2004, Dec. 6, 2004) , following a meeting of the council of ministers in 
July 2004 to revive the procedure, which had not borne fruit as expected, it was decided to end the minimum 
capital requirement for branches in other countries of the union.  
CEMAC 
In 2001, an agrément unique was instituted with CEMAC Regulation R-01/100, based on what has been the 
practice within the EU. The agrément unique allows a bank to supply financial services in another country of 
the region directly or indirectly when it is already established in one country, and provided the bank has been 
in operation for a minimum of two years and it is rated as “strong” in COBAC's SYSCO system (rating 1 
or 2). COBAC has to decide on a request for an agrément unique within three months following the 
transmittal of the application by the national monetary authority (i.e., the ministry of finance). 
 
The payment system in CEMAC countries is rudimentary, while capital markets are in their 
infancy. The current payment system is slow, unreliable, burdensome, and costly for the 
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participants. Thus, it represents a constraint on regional integration, on the implementation of 
monetary policy, and the management of commercial bank liquidity. A significant risk of 
duplication has arisen between the recently established regional stock exchange (BVMAC) 
and the already existing (yet inactive) stock exchange in Cameroon (DSX), as well as a 
potential conflicting regulatory and supervisory overlap between the (regional) Commission 
de Surveillance du Marché Financier de l’Afrique Centrale and the (Cameroonian) 
Commission des Marchés Financiers. These parallel structures risk hampering further the 
chances of successfully developing CEMAC’s securities markets. 
 
 Box 3. CEMAC: Financial Infrastructure Elements 
A rudimentary payment system in the CEMAC zone remains a serious obstacle to the 
development and integration of the financial sector. The regional payment system reform project 
comprises several components, including a Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS): an Electronic 
Bulk Payment Clearing System (EBPCS) or Regional Inter-Bank Compensation (CIR); an interbank 
bank card system (Système Monétique Interbancaire or SMI); and a “Centrale des Incidents de 
Paiement,” which is a limited credit information system. There has been slow progress on this project 
since its inception five years ago, but regional authorities expect a completion date sometime in 2008. 
The legal framework for creditor rights in CEMAC member states has been developed at two 
levels: regionally and domestically. All CEMAC countries are members of the OHADA 
(Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires), and many of the legal issues 
relating to the credit environment are governed by regional uniform legislation. However, although 
substantial matters are, to a large extent, governed by uniform the OHADA legislation, judicial (e.g., 
enforcement, court system, judicial training, and specialization), regulatory (e.g., registries, insolvency 
trustees,) and institutional (e.g., level of implementation of uniform legislation) issues are dealt with at 
the national level. While the legal framework is broadly appropriate, knowledge and understanding of 
the OHADA Acts appear to be very limited, and dissemination and training have been woefully 
inadequate. These issues are compounded by dysfunctional judicial systems, which seriously undermine 
creditor rights and represent an obstacle to the sound development of the financial sector throughout the 
region.  
The statutory framework for private sector accounting and auditing in CEMAC is strongly 
influenced by regional agreements. Basic legal accounting, reporting, and external audit requirements 
are established by the OHADA Acts, which require all joint stock companies (sociétés anonymes) to 
appoint a statutory auditor (commissaire aux comptes) to audit their annual financial statements and 
perform other independent functions. The OHADA Accounting System (Système Comptable de 
l’OHADA or “SYSCOHADA”) adopted in 2002 is based on the French Plan Comptable with some 
amendments mirroring certain principles set out in the International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS).  
 
 
 
Reputation effects and consumer preferences add to the lack of banking integration. These 
so-called “natural” barriers emerge in the form of national-based market differences, which 
relate to language, cultural preferences, considerations of geographical proximity, and 
information availability. Banks suffer from a lack of information on borrowers or other 
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banks. Local and regional credit registries and rating agencies are absent, exacerbating an 
already weak credit culture. The limited availability of information on banks prevents 
interbank market development. For instance, banks have so far failed to agree on the 
dissemination of SYSCO ratings which would help improve transparency.13 Apart from a 
few exceptions (i.e., border of Chad and Cameroon) bank flows are negligible and point to  
low-trade integration.  
IV.   BANK COMPETITION AT THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
This section seeks to assess the degree of bank competition in CEMAC. A widely-used 
technique to measure the degree of bank competition is the Panzar-Rosse (PR) model. This 
model examines the relationship between a change in factor input prices and the revenue 
earned by a bank, assuming that banks employ different pricing strategies in response to 
changes in input costs depending on the banking system’s market structure. For instance, in a 
collusive environment, assuming profit maximization, an increase in input prices will 
increase marginal cost and reduce equilibrium output and revenues. Under perfect 
competition, an increase in input prices will increase marginal cost and marginal revenue by 
the same amount.14 
Based on the PR model, we examine how banks’ revenue correlates with factor prices (Table 
7). Given the small size of the sample for some CEMAC countries, the analysis is conducted 
for the region as a whole. Because competition seems to take place primarily on a national 
level, this analysis has obvious limitations. However, it can help in understanding the present 
degree of integration and the extent to which there is competition on a regional level. The 
following equation is estimated by using individual bank data from 1993 to 2004 on 32 
banks, drawing on data provided by the COBAC: 
(1)  ln INCOME= a+ b ln(PF)+c ln(PL)+ d ln(PK)+e ln(SIZE)+f ln(CAPITAL)+g 
ln(LOANASSET) 
 
where: INCOME represents the ratio of gross revenue to total assets;15 PF the unit price of 
funds, proxied by the ratio of interest expenses to total deposits; PL the unit price of labor or 
                                                 
13 SYSCO ratings are prepared by the regional banking commission COBAC, and are based 
on the CAMEL bank rating system. So far, individual banks appear reluctant to share this 
information with their counterparts and the public. 
14 This model was used in recent country studies on Hong Kong (HKMA, 2004), India 
(Prasad, Ghosh, 2005), Canada (IMF, 2005), Malaysia (IMF, 2006), and a large set of 
countries (Claessens, Laeven, 2003). 
15 Which includes interest and noninterest revenue. Both measures with or without 
noninterest revenue are commonly used but given the role of fees and other income in an 
interest rate regulated environment such as CEMAC, a more comprehensive measure was 
preferred. 
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personnel expense to total number of employees (or assets); and PK the unit price of capital 
or other operating costs to fixed assets. The last three variables control for the characteristics 
of banks: LNSIZE (size captured by total assets), LNCAPITAL (capital by equity to assets); 
and LNLOANASSET (degree of intermediation by the ratio of loans to total assets).16 The 
sum of estimated coefficients of factor prices (i.e., b+c+d) is the H statistic and indicates the 
degree of competition. A value of H between 0 and 1 indicates monopolistic competition 
(input prices increase is associated with a less than proportional increase in revenue, as the 
demand curve for banks is inelastic). An H equal to 1 indicates perfect competition. An H 
lower than 0 indicates a monopoly or a perfectly collusive oligopoly. 
 
Table 7. Statistical Results 
 
Dependent Variable: LNINCOME 
Method: Panel Least Squares 
Sample: 1999 2004 
Cross-sections included: 30 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 140 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic Prob. 
C 1.183190 0.636091 1.860095 0.0651 
LNPF 0.115866 0.046311 2.501915 0.0136 
LNPL 0.121488 0.053786 2.258725 0.0255 
LNPK 0.031349 0.041804 0.749895 0.4546 
LNSIZE -0.010121 0.036650 -0.276147 0.7829 
LNCAPITAL 0.033769 0.031302 1.078813 0.2826 
LNLOANASSET 0.245437 0.072571 3.382027 0.0009 
R-squared 0.257038     Mean dependent var 2.359776 
Adjusted R-squared 0.223520     S.D. dependent var 0.333156 
S.E. of regression 0.293571     Akaike info criterion 0.435313 
Sum squared resid 11.46247     Schwarz criterion 0.582395 
Log likelihood -23.47189     F-statistic 7.668846 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.164012     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
   Source: IMF staff calculations. 
 
 
The estimated H statistic places CEMAC, as a region, among the least competitive 
environments (Table 8). The results: (i) confirm monopolistic competition—as is the case for 
most banking systems—and show an H value of 0.3; (ii) do not show an increase in 
competition in later years with tests performed for shorter periods; and (iii) suggest a lower 
                                                 
16 Estimates performed with fixed and random effects (not reported) provide similar results. 
Fixed effects are the most appropriate to capture idiosyncrasies in individual data, with data 
on institutions operating in the same field of business and in the same country. 
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degree of competition than for most African countries although comparisons are difficult. 
These results should not come as a surprise, given that the tests were performed at the 
regional level and there is limited regional integration. Tests performed on individual 
countries—which are made difficult by the small size of the samples—would probably show 
a higher degree of competition, for example in Cameroon in the later years. Moreover, the 
results should be compared with similar results—which are unfortunately lacking—for 
monetary unions with a common banking supervision and regulatory framework (not the case 
of the EU for instance). Finally, the results are subject to a number of statistical caveats: 
(i) the R squared is rather low; and (ii) some variables are not significant (the unit price of 
capital, control variables, size and capital).  
 
 
Table 8. H Statistic Country Comparisons 
Country Sample Period H Statistic Number of Banks Number of Observations 
Ghana 1998–2003 0.56 13 65 
Kenya 1994–2001 0.58 34 106 
Nigeria 1994–2001 0.67 42 186 
South Africa 1994–2001 0.85 45 186 
Uganda 1999:Q1–2002:Q3 0.30 15 196 
Uganda 2002:Q4–2004:Q2 0.49 15 97 
CEMAC 1993–2004 0.27 32 140 
 
   Source: IMF staff calculations, Claessens and Laeven (2004), Buchs and Mathiesen (2005), Hauner and Peiris 
(2005).  
 
 
V.   ISSUES GOING FORWARD 
Over half a century into the creation of a single currency, the picture that emerges is one of 
fragmented retail banking markets. This market segmentation the fragmentation of goods and 
labor markets (World Bank, 2003). While most of the regional institutional frameworks are 
in place, regional markets have still to emerge, and implementation of existing regulations is 
weak.  
Some measures could and should be taken to address the various obstacles to regional 
integration: 
• Legal and regulatory framework: (i) remove the various administrative and political 
obstacles to the implementation of the agrément unique (which would mean a change 
in the current general procedure for the agrément) and in particular diminish the role 
of the ministries of finance and allow banks already established to open branches 
following an easier procedure; (ii) liberalize lending and deposit rates so that they are 
no longer a constraint on the incentives for financial intermediation; (iii) have more 
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uniform reserve requirements across the region; and (iv) work on greater 
harmonization of tax regimes (notably on provisions) for banks. 
• Infrastructure, markets, reputation, and consumer preferences: (i) develop and 
implement a coherent strategy to develop regional interbank and debt markets 
consistent with efforts aimed at improving systemic liquidity management;17 
(ii) strengthen transparency by ensuring greater dissemination of bank data (SYSCO 
ratings); and (iii) establish an efficient procedure for the sharing of credit bureau 
information.  
Looking forward, more research could be undertaken on the roots of the identified 
shortcomings in integration and competition in CEMAC. On bank competition, a lack of data 
and small samples has prevented us from doing a thorough analysis at the national level, 
which, given the lack of integration within CEMAC, is likely to be the most relevant level of 
analysis. Although data limitations are likely to persist, more needs to be done to fine-tune 
the assessment of the degree of bank competition in individual countries, and to quantify the 
main factors behind noncompetitive features at the national or regional level, e.g., interest 
rate regulations. Nominal convergence dynamics also need to be better understood, in 
particular the effects of high liquidity on interest rate spreads and on the dispersion of 
lending rates. Finally, we need to better grasp the effects of both limited economic 
integration and diversification on the development and integration of banking systems, with a 
view to adjusting the appropriate sequencing in the design of policy measures. 
 
                                                 
17 See IMF (2006). 
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